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We randomly varied migrant control over El Salvador based savings by offering different types of accounts across treatment groups. Migrants offered the greatest degree of control over savings accumulated the most savings at the partner bank compared to others who were offered less or no control over savings. Effects of this treatment on savings are concentrated among migrants who expressed demand for control over remittances in the baseline survey.

We also find positive spillovers of our savings intervention in the form of increased savings at other banks specifically banks in the U.S. . We interpret the effects we find as arising from the joint effect of the bank account Chinese Overseas America Number Data offers and the marketing pitch made to study participants by our project staff. Publisher s link  people.hbs nashraf aamy SavingsinTransnationalHouseholds.pdf pdf AUGUST JOURNAL OF FINANCE Incentivizing Calculated Risk Taking Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers pdf By Cole Shawn A. Martin Kanz and Leora Klapper ABSTRACT—This paper uses a series of experiments with commercial bank loan officers to test the effect of performance incentives on risk assessment and lending decisions.  incentives lead to greater screening effort and more profitable lending their power is muted by both deferred compensation and the limited liability typically enjoyed by credit officers.





Second we present direct evidence that incentive contracts distort judgment and beliefs even among trained professionals with many years of experience. Loans evaluated under more permissive incentive schemes are rated significantly less risky than the same loans evaluated under pay for performance. Publisher s link  hbs faculty Publication Files Loan Officers dfe fbaa d f e e dd b .pdf pdf AUGUST REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STUDIES Smart Money The Effect of Education on Financial Outcomes pdf By Cole Shawn A.